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Abstract
We develop a game-theoretic framework for the study of competition between firms
who have budgets to “seed” the initial adoption of their products by consumers located
in a social network. We identify a general property of the adoption dynamics — namely,
decreasing returns to local adoption — for which the inefficiency of resource use at
equilibrium (the Price of Anarchy) is uniformly bounded above, across all networks. We
also show that if this property is violated the Price of Anarchy can be unbounded, thus
yielding sharp threshold behavior for a broad class of dynamics.
We provide similar results a new notion, the Budget Multiplier , that measures the
extent that imbalances in player budgets can be amplified at equilibrium.
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1. Introduction
The role of social networks in shaping individual choices has been brought out in a num-
ber of studies over the years.1 In the past, the deliberate use of such social influences
by external agents was hampered by the lack of good data on social networks. In recent
years, data from on-line social networking sites along with other advances in informa-
tion technology have created interest in ways that firms and governments can use social
networks to further their goals.2
In this work, we study competition between firms who use their resources to maximize
product adoption by consumers located in a social network. 3 The social network may
transmit information about products, and adoption of products by neighbors may have
direct consumption benefits. The firms, denoted Red and Blue, know the graph which
defines the social network and offer similar or interchangeable products or services. The
Email addresses: sg472@cam.ac.uk (Sanjeev Goyal), hoda@seas.upenn.edu (Hoda Heidari),
mkearns@cis.upenn.edu (Michael Kearns)
1See e.g., Coleman [? ] on doctors’ prescription of new drugs, Conley and Udry [? ] and Foster and
Rosenzweig [? ] on farmers’ decisions on crop and input choice, and Feick and Price [? ], Reingen et
al. [? ], and Godes and Mayzlin [? ] on brand choice by consumers.
2The popularity of terms such as word of mouth marketing, viral marketing, seeding the network and
peer-leading intervention is an indicator of this interest.
3Our model may apply to other settings of competitive contagion, such as between two fatal viruses
in a population.
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two firms simultaneously choose to allocate their resources on subsets of consumers, i.e.,
to seed the network with initial adoptions. The stochastic dynamics of local adoption
determine how the influence of each player’s seeds spreads throughout the graph to create
new adoptions. Our work thus builds upon recent interest in models of competitive
contagion [? ? ? ].
A distinctive feature of our framework is that we allow for a broad class of local
influence processes. We decompose the dynamics into two parts: a switching function f ,
which specifies the probability of a consumer switching from non-adoption to adoption as
a function of the fraction of his neighbors who have adopted either of the two products
Red and Blue; and a selection function g, which specifies, conditional on switching, the
probability that the consumer adopts (say) Red as function of the fraction of adopting
neighbors who have adopted Red (the decomposition into switching and selection has
some precursors in the literature, see [? ] for example). Each firm seeks to maximize
the total number of consumers who adopt its product. Broadly speaking, the switching
function captures “stickiness” of the (interchangeable) products based on their local
prevalence, and the selection function captures preference for firms based on local market
share.
This framework yields a rich class of competitive strategies, which depend in subtle
ways on the dynamics, the relative budgets of the players, and the structure of the social
network. Section 5 illustrates this point: We will see that even in a simple fixed network,
the equilibrium solution depends greatly on the parameters of the model. Also we will
see how these parameters affect other properties of the equilibrium, such as the Price of
Anarchy and the Budget Multiplier.
We then continue with understanding two general features of equilibrium: first, the
efficiency of resource use by the players (Price of Anarchy, and Price of Stability) and
second, the role of the network and dynamics in amplifying ex-ante resource differences
between the players (Budget Multiplier).
Our first set of results concern efficiency of resource use by the players. For a fixed
graph and fixed local dynamics (given by f and g), and budgets of KR and KB seed
infections for the players, let (SR, SB) be the sets of seed infections that maximize the
joint expected infections (payoffs) ΠR(SR, SB) + ΠB(SR, SB) subject to |SR| = KR and
|SB | = KB , and let σ′R and σ′B be Nash equilibrium strategies obeying the budget
constraints that minimize the joint payoff ΠR(σR, σB) + ΠB(σR, σB) across all Nash
equilibria (σR, σB). The Price of Anarchy (or PoA)
4 is then defined as:
ΠR(SR, SB) + ΠB(SR, SB)
ΠR(σ′R, σ
′
B) + ΠB(σ
′
R, σ
′
B)
.
Similarly, if σ′′R and σ
′′
B are Nash equilibrium strategies obeying the budget constraints
that maximize the joint payoff ΠR(σR, σB) + ΠB(σR, σB) across all Nash equilibria
4The PoA is a measure of the maximum potential inefficiency created by non-
cooperative/decentralized activity. In our context, if we suppose that consumers get positive
utility from consumption of firms’ products then the PoA also reflects losses in consumer welfare.
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(σR, σB), the Price of Stability (or PoS)
5 is then defined as:
ΠR(SR, SB) + ΠB(SR, SB)
ΠR(σ′′R, σ
′′
B) + ΠB(σ
′′
R, σ
′′
B)
.
Our first main result, Theorem 1, shows that if the switching function f is concave
and the selection function g is linear, then the PoA (and as a result, the PoS) is uni-
formly bounded above by 4, across all networks. The main proof technique we employ
is the construction of certain coupled stochastic dynamical processes that allow us to
demonstrate that, under the assumptions on f and g, the departure of one player can
only benefit the other player, even though the total number of joint infections can only
decrease. This in turn lets us argue that players can successfully defect to the maximum
social welfare solution and realize a significant fraction of its payoff, thus implying they
must also do so at equilibrium.
Our next main result, Theorem 2, shows that even a small amount of convexity in
the switching function f can lead to arbitrarily high PoS (and as a result PoA). This
result is obtained by constructing a family of layered networks whose dynamics effectively
compose f many times, thus amplifying its convexity. Equilibrium and large PoS are
enforced by the fact that despite this amplification, the players are better off playing
near each other: this means that if one player locates in one part of the network, the
other player has an incentive to locate close by, even if they would jointly be better off
locating in a different part of the network. Taken together, our upper and lower bounds
yield sharp threshold behavior in a parametric classes of dynamics. For example, if the
switching function is f(x) = xr for r > 0 and the selection function g is linear, then for
all r ≤ 1 the PoA is at most 4, while for any r > 1 it can be unbounded.
Our second set of results are about the effects of networks and dynamics on budget
differences across the players. We introduce and study a new quantity called the Budget
Multiplier . For any fixed graph, local dynamics, and initial budgets, with KR ≥ KB , let
(σR, σB) be the Nash equilibrium for which the quantity
ΠR(σR, σB)
ΠB(σR, σB)
× KB
KR
is maximized ; this quantity is just the ratio of the final payoffs divided by the ratio of
the initial budgets. The resulting maximized quantity is the Budget Multiplier, and it
measures the extent to which the larger budget player can obtain a final market share
that exceeds their share of the initial budgets.
Theorem 3 shows that if the switching function is concave and the selection function
is linear, then the (pure strategy) Budget Multiplier is bounded above by 2, uniformly
across all networks. The proof imports elements of the proof for the PoA upper bound,
and additionally employs a method for attributing adoptions back to the initial seeds
that generated them.
Our next result, Theorem 4, shows that even a slight departure from linearity in
the selection function can yield unbounded Budget Multiplier. The proof again appeals
5The Price of Stability (PoS) compares outcomes in the ‘best’ equilibrium with socially optimal out-
comes; one may interpret the PoS as a measure of the minimum inefficiency created by non-cooperative,
as opposed to merely decentralized, activity.
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to network structures that amplify the nonlinearity of g by self-composition, which has
the effect of “squeezing out” the player with smaller budget. Combining the Budget
Multiplier upper and lower bounds again allows us to exhibit simple parametric forms
yielding threshold behavior: for instance, if f is linear and g is from the well-studied
Tullock contest function family (discussed shortly), which includes linear g and therefore
bounded Budget Multiplier, even an infinitesimal departure from linearity can result in
unbounded Budget Multiplier.
2. Related Literature
Our paper contributes to the study of competitive strategy in network environments.
We build a framework which combines ideas from economics (contests, competitive seed-
ing and advertising) and computer science – uniform bounds on properties of equilibria, as
in the Price of Anarchy – to address a topical and natural question. The Tullock contest
function was introduced in Tullock [? ]; for an axiomatic development see Skaperdas [?
]. For early and influential studies of competitive advertising, see Butters [? ] and Gross-
man and Shapiro [? ] . The Price of Anarchy (PoA) was introduced by Koutsoupias and
Papadimitriou [? ], and important early results bounding the PoA in networked settings
regardless of network structure were given by Roughgarden and Tardos [? ]. The tension
between equilibrium and Nash efficiency is a recurring theme in economics; for a general
result on the inefficiency of Nash equilibria, see Dubey [? ].
More specifically, we contribute to the study of influence in networks. This has
been an active field of study in the last decade, see e.g., Ballester, Calvo-Armengol and
Zenou [? ]; Bharathi, Kempe and Salek [? ]; Galeotti and Goyal [? ]; Kempe, Kleinberg,
and Tardos [? ? ]; Mossel and Roch [? ]; Borodin, Filmus, and Oren [? ]; Chasparis
and Shamma [? ]; Carnes et al [? ]; Dubey, Garg and De Meyer [? ]; Vetta [? ].
There are three elements in our framework which appear to be novel: one, we consider a
fairly general class of adoption rules at the individual consumer level which correspond to
different roles which social interaction can potentially play (existing work often considers
specific local dynamics); two, we study competition for influence in a network (existing
work has often focused on the case of a single player seeking to maximize influence),
and three, we introduce and study the notion of Budget Multiplier as a measure of how
networks amplify budget differences. To the best of our knowledge, our results on the
relationship between the dynamics and qualitative features of the strategic equilibrium
are novel. Nevertheless, there are definite points of contact between our results and proof
techniques and earlier research in (single-player and competitive) contagion in networks
that we shall elaborate on where appropriate.
3. Model
3.1. Graph, Allocations, and Seeds
We consider a 2-player game of competitive adoption on a (possibly directed) graph
G over n vertices. G is known to the two players, whom we shall refer to as R(ed) and
B(lue). 6 We shall also use R,B and U(ninfected) to denote the state of a vertex in
6The restriction to 2 players is primarily for simplicity; our main results on PoA can be generalized
to a game with 2 or more players, see Appendix B.
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G, according to whether it is currently infected by one of the two players or uninfected
(Note that we are overloading the notation by giving the same name to the nodes’ states
and to the players, however throughout it will be clear from the context which one we
are referring to). The two players simultaneously choose some number of vertices to
initially seed; after this seeding, the stochastic dynamics of local adoption (discussed
below) determine how each player’s seeds spread throughout G to create adoptions by
new nodes. Each player seeks to maximize their (expected) total number of eventual
adoptions. 7
More precisely, suppose that player p = R,B has budget Kp ∈ N+; Each player
p chooses an allocation of budget across the n vertices, ap = (ap1, ap2, ..., apn), where
apj ∈ N+ and
∑n
j=1 apj = Kp. Let Lp be the set of allocations for player p, which is
their pure strategy space. A mixed strategy for player p is a probability distribution σp
on Lp. Let Ap denote the set of probability distributions for player p. The two players
simultaneously choose their strategies (σR, σB). Consider any realized initial allocation
(aR, aB) for the two players. Let V (aR) = {v|avR > 0}, V (aB) = {v|avB > 0} and
let V (aR, aB) = V (aR) ∪ V (aB). A vertex v becomes initially infected if one or more
players assigns a seed to infect v. If both players assign seeds to the same vertex, then
the probability of initial infection by a player is proportional to the seeds allocated by
the player (relative to the other player). More precisely, fix any allocation (aR, aB). For
any vertex v, the initial state sv of v is in {R,B} if and only if v ∈ V (aR, aB). Moreover,
sv = R with probability avR/(avR+avB), and sv = B with probability avB/(avR+avB).
Following the allocation of seeds, the stochastic contagion process on G determines
how these R and B infections generate new adoptions in the network. We consider
a discrete time model for this process. The state of a vertex v at time t is denoted
svt ∈ {U,R,B}, where U stands for Uninfected, R stands for infection by R, and B
stands for infection by B.
3.2. The Switching-Selection Model
We assume there is an update schedule which determines the order in which vertices
are considered for state updates. The primary simplifying assumption we shall make
about this schedule is that once a vertex is infected, it is never a candidate for updating
again.
Within this constraint, we allow for a variety of behaviors, such as randomly choosing
an uninfected vertex to update at each time step (a form of sequential updating), or
updating all uninfected vertices simultaneously at each time step (a form of parallel
updating). We can also allow for an immunity property — if a vertex is exposed once
to infection and remains uninfected after updating, it is never updated again. Update
schedules may also have finite termination times or conditions — for instance, if the
firms primarily care about the number of adoptions in the coming fiscal year. We can
also allow schedules that update each uninfected vertex only a fixed number of times. In
our framework, a schedule which perpetually updates uninfected vertices will eventually
cause any connected G to become entirely infected, thus trivializing the PoA (though not
necessarily the Budget Multiplier), but we allow for considerably more general schedules.
7Throughout the paper, we shall use the terms infection and adoption interchangeably.
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8For the stochastic update of an uninfected vertex v, we will consider what we shall call
the switching-selection model. In this model, updating is determined by the application
of two functions to v’s local neighborhood: f(x) (the switching function), and g(y) (the
selection function). More precisely, let αR and αB be the fraction of v’s neighbors
infected by R and B, respectively, at the time of the update, and let α = αR + αB be
the total fraction of infected neighbors. The function f maps α to the interval [0, 1] and
g maps αR/(αR +αB) (the relative fraction of infections that are R) to [0, 1]. These two
functions determine the stochastic update in the following fashion:
1. With probability f(α), v becomes infected by either R or B; with probability
1− f(α), v remains in state U(ninfected), and the update ends.
2. If it is determined that v becomes infected, it becomes infected by R with proba-
bility
g(αR/(αR + αB)),
and infected by B with probability
g(αB/(αR + αB)).
We assume f(0) = 0 (infection requires exposure), f(1) = 1 (full neighborhood infection
forces infection), and f is increasing (more exposure yields more infection); and g(0) = 0
(players need some local market share to win an infection), g(1) = 1. Note that since the
selection step above requires that an infection take place, we also have g(y)+g(1−y) = 1,
which implies g(1/2) = 1/2. We assume that the switching and selection functions are
the same across vertices.9
We think of the switching function as specifying how rapidly adoption increases with
the fraction of neighbors who have adopted (i.e. the stickiness of the interchangeable
products or services), regardless of their R or B value; while the selection function
specifies the probability of infection by each firm in terms of the local relative market
share split.10 In addition to being a natural decomposition of the dynamics, our results
will show that we can articulate properties of f and g which sharply characterize the
PoA and Budget Multiplier. In Section 5, we shall provide economic motivation for this
formulation and also illustrate with specific parametric families of functions f and g. We
also discuss more general models for the local dynamics at a number of places in the
paper. The Appendix also illustrates how these switching and selection functions f -g
may arise out of optimal decisions made by consumers located in social networks.
Relationship to Other Models. It is natural to consider both general and specific
relationships between our models and others in the literature, especially the widely stud-
ied general threshold model [? ? ? ]. One primary difference is our allowance of rather
8The proof of Lemma 1 specifies the technical property we need of the update schedule, which is
consistent with the examples mentioned here and many others.
9This is for expositional simplicity only; our main results on PoA and Budget Multiplier carry over to
a setting with heterogeneity across vertices (so long as the selection function remains symmetric across
the two players).
10In the threshold model a consumer switches to an action once a certain fraction of soci-
ety/neighborhood adopts that action (Granovetter, 1978). In our model, heterogeneous thresholds can
be captured in terms of different switching function f .
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general choices for the switching and selection functions f and g, and our study of how
these choices influence equilibrium properties. When considering concave f — which is
a special case of sub-modularity — the relationship becomes closer, and our proof tech-
niques bear similarity to those in the general threshold model (particularly the extensive
use of coupling arguments). Nevertheless there seem to be elements of our model not
easily captured in the general threshold model, including our allowance of rather general
update schedules that may depend on the state of a vertex; the general threshold model
asks that all randomization (in the form of the selection of a random threshold for each
vertex) occur prior to the updating process, whereas our model permits repeated ran-
domization in subsequent updates, in a possibly state-dependent fashion. We shall make
related technical comments where appropriate.
3.3. Payoffs and Equilibrium
Given a graph G and an initial allocation of seeds (aR, aB), the dynamics described
above — determined by f , g, and the update schedule — yield a stochastic number of
eventual infections for the two players. For p = R,B, let χp denote this random variable
at the termination of the dynamics. Given strategy profile (σR, σB), the payoff to player
p = R,B is Πp(σR, σB) = E[χp|(σR, σB)]. Here the expectation is over any randomiza-
tion in the player strategies in the choice of initial allocations, and the randomization in
the stochastic updating dynamics. A Nash equilibrium is a profile of strategies (σR, σB)
such that σp maximizes player p’s payoff given the strategy σ−p of the other player.
3.4. Price of Anarchy, Price of Stability and Budget Multiplier
For a fixed graph G, stochastic update dynamics, and budgets KR,KB , the max-
imum payoff allocation is the (deterministic) allocation (a∗R, a
∗
B) obeying the budget
constraints that maximizes E[χR + χB |(aR, aB)]. For the same fixed graph, update
dynamics and budgets, let (σ′R, σ
′
B) be the Nash equilibrium strategies that minimize
E[χR+χB |(σR, σB)] among all Nash equilibria (σR, σB) — that is, the Nash equilibrium
with the smallest joint payoff, then the Price of Anarchy (or PoA) is defined to be
E[χR + χB |(a∗R, a∗B)]
E[χR + χB |(σ′R, σ′B)]
The Price of Anarchy is a measure of the inefficiency in resource use created due to
decentralized/ non-cooperative behavior by the two players. In the context of competition
between firms, one interpretation of the PoA is as a measure of the relative improvement
in efficiency effected by a hypothetical merger of the firms.
For the same setting if (σ′′R, σ
′′
B) is the Nash equilibrium strategies that maximize
E[χR+χB |(σR, σB)] among all Nash equilibria (σR, σB) — that is, the Nash equilibrium
with the largest joint payoff, then the Price of Stability (or PoS) is defined to be
E[χR + χB |(a∗R, a∗B)]
E[χR + χB |(σ′′R, σ′′B)]
The Price of Stability is a measure of the inefficiency in resource use created due to non-
cooperative behavior by the two players. In the context of competition between firms,
one interpretation of the PoS is as a measure of the relative improvement in efficiency
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effected by a hypothetical objective authority that can help players reach a good Nash
equilibrium.
We also introduce and study a new quantity called the Budget Multiplier . The Budget
Multiplier measures the extent to which network structure and dynamics can amplify
initial resource inequality across the players. Thus for any fixed graph G and stochastic
update dynamics, and initial budgets KR,KB , with KR ≥ KB , let (σR, σB) be the Nash
equilibrium for which the ratio
ΠR(σR, σB)
ΠB(σR, σB)
× KB
KR
is maximized . The resulting maximized ratio is the Budget Multiplier, and it measures
the extent to which the larger budget player can obtain a final market share that exceeds
their share of the initial budgets.
4. Local Dynamics: Motivation
In this section, we provide some examples of the decomposition of the local update
dynamics into a switching function f and a selection function g. As discussed above,
we view the switching function as representing how contagious a product or service is,
regardless of which competing party provides it; and we view the selection function as
representing the extent to which a firm having majority local market share favors its
selection in the case of adoption. We illustrate the richness of this model by examining a
variety of different mathematical choices for the functions f and g, and discuss examples
from the domain of technology adoption that might (qualitatively) match these forms.
Finally, to illustrate the scope of this formulation, we also discuss examples of natural
update dynamics that cannot be decomposed in this way.
A fairly broad class of dynamics is captured by the following parametric family of
functions. The switching function
f(x) = xr r ≥ 0
and the selection function
g(y) = ys/(ys + ((1− y)s) s ≥ 0.
Regarding this form for f , for r = 1 we have linear adoption. For r < 1 we have f
concave, corresponding to cases in which the probability of adoption rises quickly with
only a small fraction of adopting neighbors, but then saturates or levels off with larger
fractions of adopting neighbors. In contrast, for r > 1 we have f convex, which at very
large values of r can begin to approximate threshold adoption behavior — the probability
of adoption remains small until some fraction of neighbors has adopted, then rises rapidly.
See Figure 1.
Regarding this form for g, which is known as the Tullock contest function (Tullock
(1980)), for s = 1 we have a (linear) voter model in which the probability of selection is
proportional to local market share. For s < 1 we have what we shall call an equalizing
g, by which we mean that selection of the minority party in the neighborhood is favored
relative to the linear voter model g(y) = y; and for s > 1 we have a polarizing g, meaning
8
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Figure 1: Left: Plots of f(x) = xr for varying choices of r, including r = 1 (linear, red line), r < 1
(concave), and r > 1 (convex). Right: Plots of g(y) = ys/(ys + (1 − y)s) for varying choices of s,
including s = 1 (linear, red line), s < 1 (equalizing), and s > 1 (polarizing).
that the minority party is disfavored relative to the linear model. As s approaches 0,
we approach the completely equalizing choice g ≡ 1/2, and as s approaches infinity, we
approach the completely polarizing winner-take-all g; see Figure 1.
These parametric families of switching and selection functions will play an important
role in illustrating our general results. The appendix discussed a few technology adop-
tion examples which are (qualitatively) covered by these families of functions. In the
proofs of some of our results, it will sometimes be convenient to use a more general adop-
tion function formulation with some additional technical conditions that are met by our
switching-selection formulation. We will refer to this general, single-step model as the
generalized adoption function model. In this model, if the local fractions of Red and Blue
neighbors are αR and αB , the probability that we update the vertex with an R infection
is h(αR, αB) for some adoption function h with range [0, 1], and symmetrically the proba-
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Figure 2: A sample graph G.
bility of B infection is thus h(αB , αR). Let us use H(αR, αB) = h(αR, αB)+h(αB , αR) to
denote the total infection probability under h. Note that we can still always decompose h
into a two-step process by defining the switching function to be f(αR, αB) = H(αR, αB)
and defining the selection function to be
g(αR, αB) = h(αR, αB)/(h(αR, αB) + h(αB , αR))
which is the infection-conditional probability that R wins the infection. The switching-
selection model is thus the special case of the generalized adoption function model in
which H(αR, αB) = f(αR + αB) is a function of only αR + αB , and g(αR, αB) is a
function of only αR/(αR + αB).
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5. Examples
We provide a simple example showing the effect of the switching and selection func-
tions, and the relative budgets of the players, on the equilibrium solution.
Consider the graph G illustrated in figure 2. Here N is chosen to be much larger
than (KR + KB). The update schedule we consider for this example is a single parallel
update, however all the claims hold as well for any other update schedule in which every
node is updated exactly once. We also assume f(x) = xα, therefore f is convex when
α > 1, it is linear when α = 1, and it is concave when 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
Observe that in an equilibrium on G, no seed is ever placed on the bottom layer
of a component, therefore in order to simplify the statement of our claims, we say a
player chooses one component, when she puts some of her seeds on the top layer of that
component.
We claim that the following propositions hold:
11While the decomposition in terms of a switching function and a selection function accommodates a
fairly wide range of adoption dynamics there are some cases which are ruled out. Consider the choice
h(x, y) = x(1 − y2); it is easily verified that the total probability of adoption H(x, y) is increasing in x
and y. But H(x, y) clearly cannot be expressed as a function of the form f(x+y). Similarly, it is easy to
construct an adoption function that is not only not decomposable, but violates monotonicity. Imagine
consumers that prefer to adopt the majority choice in their neighborhood, but will only adopt once their
local neighborhood market is sufficiently settled in favor of one or the other product. The probability of
total adoption may then be higher with x = 0.2, y = 0 as compared to x = y = 0.4.
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• If f is concave, regardless of the form of g (whether linear, equalizing or punishing),
the only equilibrium is the case where players put each of their seeds in a separate
component of G, i.e. there is no more than one seed in each component.
Here is the reason: Suppose not and in the equilibrium, r + b > 1 seeds are on the
top layer of one of the components, say Ci, where r is the number of Red seeds,
and b is the number of blue seeds on Ci. We know that the expected number of
infections in that component is T = N ×f( r+bKR+KB ). Let us define the “fair share”
of Red and Blue in Ci to be T × rr+b and T × br+b respectively. Observe that
regardless of g, there exist a player (say Red) whose actual share is less than or
equal to her fair share. Now note that if the Red player moves her seeds from Ci
and put each of them in a separate empty component, her expected payoff would
be N × f( 1KR+KB )× r which we claim is larger than her current payoff. Note that
Red’s current payoff is at most N × f( r+bKR+KB )× rr+b , so it suffices to show that:
N × f( 1
KR +KB
)× r > N × f( r + b
KR +KB
)× r
r + b
To prove the above holds, we note that it is equivalent to:
f(
1
KR +KB
) > f(
r + b
KR +KB
)× 1
r + b
and the last equation holds due to concavity of f . This means that the Red player
can increase her payoff by moving her seeds from Ci to empty components of G,
which contradicts the assumption of being in an equilibrium.
• If f is convex and g is linear, the only equilibrium is the case where both players
put all of their seeds in the same component.
The reason the above holds is as follows: When g is linear every player gets her fair
share (as defined earlier) of the total number of infections in each component. Now
note that every time a player moves her seeds from one component to a component
with larger number of seeds on, due to the convexity of f , she is increasing the
total number of her infections in G. To be more precise, suppose there are r + b
seeds on component Ci and r
′ + b′ seeds on component Cj where r + b ≥ r′ + b′.
The payoff per seed for Red in Ci and Cj are:
N × f( r + b
KR +KB
)/(r + b)
and
N × f( r
′ + b′
KR +KB
)/(r′ + b′)
respectively. By moving her seeds from Cj to Ci, the payoff per seed for Red will
become:
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N × f( r + b+ r
′
KR +KB
)/(r + b+ r′)
Which is larger than the previous two due to the convexity of f . This means that
the best response to a given opponent strategy is always to find the component
with the largest number of seeds, and put all the seeds there. Therefore the only
equilibrium will be the case where all the seeds are on the same component.
• If f is convex, g is equalizing, and KRKB = 1, depending on whether f or g has a
stronger impact, the equilibrium solution can vary. In other words the convexity of
f makes players put their seeds close to one another to increase the total number of
infections, whereas the equalizing effect of g makes them avoid having the majority
of seeds in any component. Therefore players face a trade-off that results in various
equilibrium solutions.
If we fix g and make f very convex then the only equilibrium will be the case where
both players put all of their seeds in the same component. The reason is that
adding a seed to a larger group of seeds increases the total number of infections by
a relatively large amount that makes the unfair share acceptable.
On the other hand, if we fix g and make f less and less convex, not being the
majority becomes a more important condition to satisfy. If f is linear for example,
one equilibrium is the case where Red and Blue seeds are paired with each other
on KR different components (it is very easy to verify this: first note that moving
seeds does not change the total number of infections in G; second, moving a seed
to an empty component clearly does not add to the number of infections one can
get –although the assignment remains stable, and third and last, moving a seed to
a component that already has a few seeds on, just makes the corresponding player
the majority on that component, which is not desirable).
• If f is convex, g is punishing, and KRKB = 1, one equilibrium is the case where both
players put all of their seeds in the same component. Note that in this case the
convexity of f makes players put their seeds close to each other. In addition the
punishing effect of g makes being the majority desirable. Now it is easy to see
that the above case is an equilibrium: given the opponent puts all her seeds on one
component, the best one can do is to add her seeds to the same component.
If f is too convex, then the above will be the only equilibrium. As f gets closer to
linear, more stable solutions emerge as well.
• If f is convex, g is equalizing, and KRKB > 1, again various solutions are possible
depending on f and g.
If f is very convex the only equilibrium is the case where both players put all of
their seeds in the same component. As f becomes closer to linear, the red player
plays as diverse as she can by putting each of her seeds on different components of
G to avoid becoming the majority in any component. The best response of Blue
then would be to play each of her seeds in a different component (not necessarily
empty of Red seeds).
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• If f is convex, g is punishing, and KRKB > 1, then the Red (larger budget) player
tries to gather her seeds close to each other and the Blue player’s seeds, as it makes
both the total infections and her share, larger at the same time. The blue player
on the other hand avoids playing close to Red seeds, unless f is very convex and he
gets very few infections in case of not playing close to Red seeds. Thus depending
on which function has a stronger impact, the equilibrium solution may be different.
If f is very convex the only equilibrium is the case where both players put all of their
seeds in the same component. As f becomes closer to linear, the blue player can
play farther from Red. If f is linear for example, there is no pure Nash equilibrium,
but the high-level strategies of the players would be to place their seeds in a way
that they become the majority in as many components as they can.
The general points the above example makes are the following:
1. Fixing g, As f becomes more and more concave, each player tends to keep their
seeds far from one another and also from the opponent’s seeds.
2. Fixing g, the more convex f gets, the more the players tendency to keep their seeds
close to each other and also close to the opponent’s seeds.
3. Fixing f , the more equalizing g gets, the player with smaller budget tends to
play near the large-budget player, while the large budget player avoids being the
majority. The quantity KRKB indicates how effective this is: if it is small, e.g. 1, g
does not affect the equilibrium greatly.
4. Fixing f , the more punishing g gets, the player with larger budget tends to play
near the small-budget player, while the small budget player avoids playing close to
her opponent. The quantity KRKB indicates how effective this is: if it is small, e.g.
1, g does not affect the equilibrium greatly.
Here we chose a symmetric network to be able to see the pure effect of f , g and KRKB
on the equilibrium. When the underlying network is not symmetric players face another
trade-off that rises due to the effect of the network structure. For example although it is
in general true that the more concave f gets, the more far apart players put their seeds,
this does not hold in all networks, e.g. if the network has only a few important vertices,
then players still play near each other to compete for those high impact vertices.
6. Results: Price of Anarchy and Price of Stability
We first develop a number of examples to illustrate the trade-offs and the issues with
regard to costs of decentralization. We then state and prove a theorem providing general
conditions in the switching-selection model under which the Price of Anarchy is bounded
by a constant that is independent of the size and structure of the graph G. The simplest
characterization is that f being any concave function (satisfying f(0) = 0, f(1) = 1 and
f increasing), and g being the linear voter function g(y) = y leads to bounded PoS; but
we shall see the conditions allow for certain combinations of concave f and nonlinear
g as well. We then prove a lower bound showing that the concavity of f is required
for bounded PoS in a very strong sense — a small amount of convexity can lead to
unbounded PoS.
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6.1. PoA: Examples
Suppose that budgets of the firms are KR = KB = 1, and the update rule is such
that all vertices are updated only once. The network contains two connected components
with 10 vertices and 100 vertices, respectively. In each component there are 2 influential
vertices, each of which is connected to the other 8 and 98 vertices, respectively. So in
component 1, there are 16 directed links while in component 2 there are 196 directed
links in all.
• Suppose that the switching function and the selection function are both linear,
f(x) = x and g(y) = y. Then there is a unique equilibrium in which players place
their seeds on distinct influential vertices of component 2. The total infection is
then 100 and this is the maximum number of infections possible with 2 seeds. So
here the PoA is 1.
• Let us now alter the switching function such that f(1/2) =  for some  < 1/25
(keeping f(1) = 1, as always), but retain the selection function to be g(y) = y.
Now there also exists an equilibrium in which the firms locate on the influential
vertices of component 1. In this equilibrium payoffs to each player are equal to 5.
Observe that for  < 1/25, a deviation to the other component is not profitable: it
yields an expected payoff equal to 1 +  × 98, and this is strictly smaller than 5.
Since it is still possible to infect component 2 with 2 seeds, the PoA is 10. Here
inefficiency is created by a coordination failure of the players.
• Finally, suppose there is only one component with 110 vertices, with 2 influential
vertices and 108 vertices receiving directed links. Then equilibrium under both
switching functions considered above will involve firms locating at the 2 influential
vertices and this will lead to infection of all vertices. So the PoA is 1, irrespective
of whether the switching function is linear f(x) = x or whether f(1/2) < 1/25.
Thus for a fixed network, updating rule and selection function, variations in the
switching function can generate large variations in the PoA. Similarly, for fixed update
rule and switching and selection functions, a change in the network structure yields very
different PoA.
Theorem 1 provides a set of sufficient conditions on switching and selection function,
under which the PoA is uniformly bounded from above. Theorem 2 shows how even
small violations of these conditions can lead to arbitrarily high PoA.
6.2. PoA: Upper Bound
We find it useful to state and prove our theorems using the generalized adoption
model formulation described in section 4, but with some additional conditions on h that
we now discuss. If h(αR, αB) (respectively, h(αB , αR)) is the probability that a vertex
with fractions αR and αB of R and B neighbors is infected by R (respectively, B), we say
that the total infection probability H(αR, αB) = h(αR, αB)+h(αB , αR) is additive in its
arguments (or simply additive) if H can be written H(αR, αB) = f(αR + αB) for some
increasing function f — in other words, h permits interpretation as a switching function.
We shall say that h is competitive if h(αR, αB) ≤ h(αR, 0) for all αR, αB ∈ [0, 1]. In
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other words, a player always has equal or higher infection probability in the absence of
the other player.
Concave f and linear g. Observe that the switching-selection formulation always
satisfies the additivity property by definition. Moreover, in the switching-selection for-
mulation, if g is linear, the competitiveness condition becomes
h(x, y) = f(x+ y)(x/(x+ y)) ≤ f(x) = h(x, 0)
or
f(x+ y)/(x+ y) ≤ f(x)/x.
This condition is satisfied by the concavity of f . We will later see that the following
theorem also applies to certain combinations of concave f and nonlinear g. The first
theorem can now be stated.
Theorem 1. If the adoption function h(αR, αB) is competitive and H is additive in its
arguments, then Price of Anarchy is at most 4 for any graph G.
Proof We establish the theorem via a series of lemmas and inequalities that can be
summarized as follows. Let (S∗R, S
∗
B) be an initial allocation of infections that gives the
maximum joint payoff, and let (SR, SB) be a pure
12 Nash equilibrium with SR being
the larger set of seeds, so KR = |S∗R| = |SR| ≥ KB = |S∗B | = |SB |. We first establish
a general lemma (Lemma 1) that implies that the set S∗R alone (without S
∗
B present)
must yield payoffs close to the maximum joint payoff (Corollary 1). The proof involves
the construction of a coupled stochastic process technique we employ repeatedly in the
paper. 13 We then contemplate a deviation by the Red player to (S∗R, SB). Another
coupling argument (Lemma 2) establishes that the total payoffs for both players under
(S∗R, SB) must be at least those for the Red player alone under (S
∗
R, ∅). This means
that under (S∗R, SB), one of the two players must be approaching the maximum joint
infections. If it is Red, we are done, since Red’s equilibrium payoff must also be this
large. If it is Blue, Lemma 1 implies that Blue could still get this large payoff even after
the departure of Red. Next we invoke Lemma 2 to show that total eventual payoff to
both players under (SR, SB) must exceed this large payoff accruing to Blue, proving the
theorem.
Lemma 1. Let AR and AB be any sets of seed vertices for the two players. Then if h
is competitive,
E[χR|(AR, ∅)] ≥ E[χR|(AR, AB)]
and
E[χB |(∅, AB)] ≥ E[χB |(AR, AB)].
12The extension to mixed strategies is straightforward and omitted.
13The theorem includes concave (and therefore sub-modular) f and makes extensive use of coupling
arguments to prove local-to-global effects (of which Lemmas 1 and 2 are examples); this bears a similarity
to the work of Mossel and Roch [? ], and it has been suggested that our proofs might be simplified by
appeal to their results. However, we have not been able to apply their results in our context. Two features
of our framework seem to make direct application difficult: first, the important role of competitive effects,
which is explicit in Lemma 1; and second, the variety of updating schedules we consider appear not be
covered by the general threshold model which underlies the Mossel and Roch analysis. While we suspect
more direct relationships might be possible in special cases, here we provide proofs specific to our model.
15
Proof We provide the proof for the first statement involving χR; the proof for χB is
identical. We introduce a simple coupled simulation technique that we shall appeal to
several times throughout the paper. Consider the stochastic dynamical process on G
under two different initial conditions: both AR and AB are present (the joint process,
denoted (AR, AB) in the conditioning in the statement of the lemma); and only the
set AR is present (the solo Red process, denoted (AR, ∅)). Our goal is to define a new
stochastic process on G, called the coupled process, in which the state of each vertex v
will be a pair < Xv, Yv >. We shall arrange that Xv faithfully represents the state of
a vertex in the joint process, and Yv the state in the solo Red process. However, these
state components will be correlated or coupled in a deliberate manner. More precisely,
we wish to arrange the coupled process to have the following properties:
1. At each step, and for any vertex state < Xv, Yv >, Xv ∈ {U,R,B} and Yv ∈ {U,R}.
2. Projecting the states of the coupled process onto either component faithfully yields
the respective process. Thus, if < Xv, Yv > represents the state of vertex v in the
coupled process, then the {Xv} are stochastically identical to the joint process, and
the {Yv} are stochastically identical to the solo Red process.
3. At each step, and for any vertex state < Xv, Yv >, Xv = R implies Yv = R.
Note that the first two properties are easily achieved by simply running independent joint
and solo Red processes. But this will violate the third property, which yields the lemma,
and thus we introduce the coupling.
For any vertex v, we define its initial coupled process state < Xv, Yv > as follows:
Xv = R if v ∈ AR, Xv = B if v ∈ AB , and Xv = U otherwise; and Yv = R if v ∈ AR,
and Yv = U otherwise. It is easily verified that these initial states satisfy Properties 1
and 3 above, thus encoding the initial states of the two separate processes.
Assume for now that the first vertex 14 v to be updated in the X and Y processes
are the same — i.e. the same vertices are updated in both the joint and solo update
schedules, which may in general depend on the state of the network in each. We now
describe the coupled updates of v. Let αRv denote the fraction of v’s neighbors w such
that Xw = R, and α
B
v the fraction such that Xw = B. Note that by the initialization of
the coupled process, αRv is also equal to the fraction of Yw = R (which we denote α˜
R
v ).
In the joint process, the probability that v is updated to R is h(αRv , α
B
v ), and to B is
h(αBv , α
R
v ). In the solo Red process, the probability that v is updated to R is h(α
R
v , 0),
which by competitiveness is greater than or equal to h(αRv , α
B
v ).
We can thus define the update dynamics of the coupled process as follows: pick a real
value z uniformly at random from [0, 1]. Update the state < Xv, Yv > of v as follows:
• Xv update: If z ∈ [0, h(αRv , αBv )), update Xv to R; if z ∈ [h(αRv , αBv ), h(αRv , αBv ) +
h(αBv , α
R
v )], updateXv to B; otherwise, updateXv to U . Note that the probabilities
Xv are updated to R and B exactly match those of the joint process, as required
by Property 2 above. See Figure 3.
• Yv update: If z ∈ [0, h(αRv , 0)], update Yv to R; otherwise, update Yv to U . The
probability Yv is updated to R is thus exactly h(α
R
v , 0), matching that in a solo
Red process. See Figure 3.
14Or vertices; the argument will be similar if more than one vertex are updated at the same time.
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Figure 3: Illustration of the coupled dynamics defined in the proof of Lemma 1. In the update dynamic
for Xv (top line), the probabilities of Red and Blue updates are represented by disjoint line segments
of length h(αRv , α
B
v ) and h(α
B
v , α
R
v ) respectively. By competitiveness, the Red segment has length less
than h(αRv , 0), which is the probability of Red update of Yv (bottom line). The dashed red lines indicate
this inequality. Thus by the arrangement of the line segments we enforce the invariant that Xv = R
implies Yv = R.
Since by competitiveness, z ∈ [0, h(αRv , αBv )) implies z ∈ [0, hR(αRv , 0)], we ensure Prop-
erty 3. Thus in subsequent updates we shall have αR ≤ α˜R. Thus as long as h(αR, αB) ≤
h(α˜R, 0) we can continue to maintain the invariant. These inequalities follow from com-
petitiveness.
So far we have assumed the same vertices were candidates for updating in both the
joint and solo processes; while this may be true for some update schedules, including
fixed or predetermined schedules, in general it will not be. So we discuss the case of
random, and parallel schedules separately. For a random schedule in which the order of
state updates is determined randomly, our coupling argument still works, we just need
to fix one specific realization of the random schedule at the very beginning and then
repeat our coupling argument. Finally we handle parallel schedules by considering three
cases. Case 1: Assuming Property 3 holds, if a vertex is a candidate for updating in both
processes, we can maintain this property by performing the coupled updates described
above. Case 2: If a vertex v is a candidate for updating only in the solo red process,
then by Property 3 Xv cannot be R, so Property 3 will still hold after the update of Yv.
Case 3: Finally, if v is a candidate for updating only in the joint process, then if Yv = R,
Property 3 will still hold after the update of Xv, and if Yv = U and all neighbors of v
in the joint process are B, Property 3 will remain true after the update. The only case
remaining is that Yv = U and v has R neighbors in the joint process. This is impossible
for the parallel update schedule: v should have also been a candidate for updating in the
solo red process, since by Property 3 v has weakly more R neighbors in the solo process.
Since Properties 2 and 3 hold on an update-by-update basis in any run or sample path
of the coupled dynamics, they also hold in expectation over runs, yielding the statement
of the lemma. 2 (Lemma 1)
Corollary 1. Let AR and AB be any sets of seeded nodes for the two players. Then if
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the adoption function h(αR, αB) is competitive,
E[χR + χB |(AR, AB)] ≤ E[χR|(AR, ∅)] + E[χB |(∅, AB)].
Proof Follows from linearity of expectation applied to the left hand side of the inequality,
and two applications of Lemma 1. 2 (Corollary 1)
Let (S∗R, S
∗
B) be the maximum joint payoff seed sets. Let (SR, SB) be any (pure) Nash
equilibrium, with SR having the larger budget. Corollary 1 implies either E[χR|(S∗R, ∅)]
or E[χB |(∅, S∗B)] is at least as great as E[χR + χB |(S∗R, S∗B)]/2; so assume without loss
of generality 15 that E[χR|(S∗R, ∅)] ≥ E[χR + χB |(S∗R, S∗B)]/2. Let us now contemplate
a unilateral deviation of the Red player from SR to S
∗
R, in which case the strategies are
(S∗R, SB). In the following lemma we show that the total number of eventual adoptions
for the two players is larger than adoptions accruing to a single player under solo seeding.
Lemma 2. Let AR and AB be any sets of seeded nodes for the two players. If H is
additive,
E[χR + χB |(AR, AB)] ≥ E[χR|(AR, ∅)].
Proof We employ a coupling argument similar to that in the proof of Lemma 1. We
define a stochastic process in which the state of a vertex v is a pair < Xv, Yv > in which
the following properties are obeyed:
1. At each step, and for any vertex state < Xv, Yv >, Xv ∈ {R,B,U} and Yv ∈
{R,U}.
2. Projecting the state of the coupled process onto either component faithfully yields
the respective process. Thus, if < Xv, Yv > represents the state of vertex v in
the coupled process, then the {Xv} are stochastically identical to the joint process
(AR, AB), and the {Yv} are stochastically identical to the solo Red process (AR, ∅).
3. At each step, and for any vertex state < Xv, Yv >, Yv = R implies Xv = R or
Xv = B.
We initialize the coupled process in the obvious way: if v ∈ AR then Xv = R, if
v ∈ AB then Xv = B, and Xv = U otherwise; and if v ∈ AR then Yv = R, and
Yv = U otherwise. Let us fix a vertex v to update, and let α
R
v , α
B
v denote the fraction of
neighbors w of v with Xw = R and Xw = B respectively, and let α˜
R
v denote the fraction
with Yw = R. Initially we have α
R
v = α˜
R
v .
We assume the vertex or vertices v to be updated in the X and Y processes are the
same; the fact that the update schedules may cause these sets to differ is handled in
the same way as in the proof of Lemma 1. On the first update of v in the joint process
(AR, AB), the total probability infection by either R or B is
H(αRv , α
B
v ) = h(α
R
v , α
B
v ) + h(α
B
v , α
R
v ).
15If this does not hold, instead of (S∗R, S
∗
B), consider the seed set (T
∗
R, T
∗
B) in which T
∗
R = S
∗
B∪(S∗R−S)
and T ∗B = S where S is any subset of S
∗
R of size KB for which S ∪S∗B ∪ (S∗R −S) = S∗R ∪S∗B . Note that
this new seed set also maximize the joint payoff.
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Figure 4: Illustration of the coupled dynamics defined in the proof of Lemma 2. In the update dynamic
for Xv (top line), the probabilities of Red and Blue updates are represented by line segments of length
h(αRv , α
B
v ) and h(α
B
v , α
R
v ) respectively. By additivity of H, together these two segments are greater than
h(αRv , 0) which is the probability of Red update of Yv (bottom line). This inequality is represented by
the dashed black lines.
In the solo process (AR, ∅), the probability of infection by R is h(αRv , 0) ≤ h(αRv , 0) +
h(0, αRv ) = H(α
R
v , 0) ≤ H(αRv , αBv ) where the last inequality follows by the additivity of
H.
We thus define the update dynamics in the coupled process as follows: pick a real
value z uniformly at random from [0, 1]. Update < Xv, Yv > as follows:
• Xv update:
If z ∈ [0, h(αRv , αBv )), update Xv to R;
if z ∈ [h(αRv , αBv ), h(αRv , αBv ) + h(αBv , αRv )]
≡ [h(αRv , αBv ), H(αRv , αBv )], update Xv to B;
otherwise update Xv to U . See Figure 4.
• Yv update: If r ∈ [0, h(αRv , 0)), update Yv to R;
otherwise update Yv to U . See Figure 4.
It is easily verified that at each such update, the probabilities of R and B updates of Xv
are exactly as in the joint (AR, AB) process, and the probability of an R update of Yv
is exactly as in the solo (AR, ∅) process, thus maintaining Property 2 above. Property 3
follows from the previously established fact that h(αRv , 0) ≤ H(αRv , αBv ), so whenever Yv
is updated to R, Xv is updated to either R or B.
Notice that since h(αRv , 0) ≥ h(αRv , αBv ) by competitiveness, for the overall theorem
(which requires competitiveness of h) we cannot ensure that Yv = R is always accompa-
nied by Xv = R. Thus the Red infections in the solo process may exceed those in the joint
process, yielding α˜Rv > α
R
v for subsequent updates. To maintain Property 3 in subsequent
updates we thus require that α˜Rv ≤ αRv + αBv implies h(α˜Rv , 0) ≤ H(α˜Rv , 0) ≤ H(αRv , αBv )
which follows from the additivity of H. Also, notice that since the lemma holds for every
fixed AR and AB , it also holds in expectation for mixed strategies. 2 (Lemma 2)
Continuing the analysis of a unilateral deviation by the Red player from SR to S
∗
R,
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we have thus established
E[χR + χB |(S∗R, SB)]
= E[χR|(S∗R, SB)] + E[χB |(S∗R, SB)]
≥ E[χR|(S∗R, ∅)]
≥ E[χR + χB |(S∗R, S∗B)]/2
where the equality is by linearity of expectation, the first inequality follows from Lemma 2,
and the second inequality from Corollary 1. Thus at least one of E[χR|(S∗R, SB)] and
E[χB |(S∗R, SB)] must be at least E[χR + χB |(S∗R, S∗B)]/4.
If E[χR|(S∗R, SB)] ≥ E[χR+χB |(R∗, B∗)]/4, then since (SR, SB) is Nash, E[χR|(SR, SB)] ≥
E[χR + χB |(S∗R, S∗B)]/4, and the theorem is proved. The only remaining case is where
E[χB |(S∗R, SB)] ≥ E[χR + χB |(S∗R, S∗B)]/4. But Lemma 1 has already established that
E[χB |(∅, SB)] ≥ E[χB |(S∗R, SB)], and we have E[χR+χB |(SR, SB)] ≥ E[χB |(∅, SB)] from
Lemma 2. Combining, we have the following chain of inequalities:
E[χR + χB |(SR, SB)] ≥ E[χB |(∅, SB)]
≥ E[χB |(S∗R, SB)]
≥ E[χR + χB |(S∗R, S∗B)]/4
thus establishing the theorem. 2 (Theorem 1)
Concave f , non-linear g. Recall that the switching-selection formulation in which
f is concave and g is linear satisfies the hypothesis of the Theorem above. But Theorem 1
also provides more general conditions for bounded PoA in the switching-selection model.
For example, suppose we consider switching functions of the form f(x) = xr for r ≤ 1
(thus yielding concavity) and selection functions of the Tullock contest form g(y) =
ys/(ys + (1− y)s), as discussed in Section 3.2. Letting a and b denote the local fraction
of Red and Blue neighbors for notational convenience, this leads to an adoption function
of the form h(a, b) = (a+ b)r/(1 + (b/a)s). The condition for competitiveness is
h(a, 0)− h(a, b) = ar − (a+ b)r/(1 + (b/a)s) ≥ 0.
Dividing through by (a+ b)r yields
(a/(a+ b))r − 1/(1 + (b/a)s)
= 1/(1 + (b/a))r − 1/(1 + (b/a)s) ≥ 0.
Making the substitution z = b/a and moving the second term to the right-hand side
gives
1/(1 + z)r ≥ 1/(1 + zs).
Thus competitiveness is equivalent to the condition 1 + zs ≥ (1 + z)r for all z ≥ 0. It
is not difficult to show that any s ∈ [r, 1] will satisfy this condition. In other words, the
more concave f is (i.e. the smaller r is), the more equalizing g can be (i.e. the smaller s
can be) while maintaining competitiveness. By Theorem 1 we have thus shown:
Corollary 2. Let the switching function be f(x) = xr for r ≤ 1 and let g(y) = ys/(ys +
(1− y)s) be the selection function. Then as long as s ∈ [r, 1], the Price of Anarchy is at
most 4 for any graph.
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6.3. PoS: Lower Bound
We now show that concavity of the switching function is required in a very strong
sense — essentially, even a slight convexity leads to unbounded PoS.
Theorem 2. Let the switching function be f(x) = xr for any r > 1, and let the selection
function be linear g(y) = y. Then for any V > 0, there exists a graph G for which the
Price of Stability is greater than V .
Proof The idea is to create a layered, directed graph whose dynamics rapidly amplify
the convexity of f . We show that for any arbitrary natural number V , there is a graph
in which the price of stability is larger than V .
Suppose KR = 1 and KB = K where K > V . Let  =
1
(K+1)4 . Since r > 1 and
K
K+1 < 1 we can choose a constant l such that (
K
K+1 )
rl < .
Consider the graph G consisting of two components A,B depicted in figure 5. Com-
ponent B is a (l+2)-layered graph, where the first layer has (K+1) vertices, the second,
third, and the (l + 1)th layer all have M vertices with M = K+1 = (K + 1)
5, and the
last layer has N vertices where N is much larger than K (say N = O(10K)). A node in
layer i (1 ≤ i ≤ l) of component B has an outgoing edge to every node in layer (i + 1).
Component A = K1,Q is a complete bipartite graph with Q =
Ml+N
K+1 + 1.
When the first layer of B is entirely covered with seeds i.e. all the (K + 1) seeds are
placed on u1, ..., uK+1, the eventual number of infected nodes in that component is equal
to K+1+ lM+N . We claim that this case maximizes the eventual number of infections:
First observe that if there are less than (K + 1) seeds in component B, it is not possible
for infections in its last layer to be larger than N : If the seeds are on the first layer, the
number of infections in the last layer would be ( KK+1 )
rl ×N which is less than N due to
the way we chose l. Also if the seeds are on a layer other than the first layer of B, then
no more than KM <  fraction of that layer can be infected which results in a number
of infections less than N in the last layer. Therefore it is not possible for number of
infections in the last layer of B to be larger than N when there are less than (K + 1)
initial seeds put on component B. (We note that the claims with regard to infections are
‘approximate’: the actual infections will converge to these approximations, as the layers
get large).
Since the total number of infections in component A cannot be greater than the
number of nodes in it i.e. Ml+NK+1 + 2, the expected total number of infections in G when
the first layer of B is not entirely covered with seeds would be less than N + lM +K +
Ml+N
K+1 + 2. The later is less than K + 1 + lM + N once N is chosen sufficiently large.
Therefore we can conclude that the expected number of infections is maximized when all
the seeds are on the first layer of component B.
Note that the assignment that maximizes the expected number of infections is not an
equilibrium since in that case the Red player gets (in expectation) Ml+NK+1 + 1 infections,
and therefore she is better off by moving her only seed to u where she gets slightly more,
i.e. Ml+NK+1 + 2 infections in expectation.
Next we proceed to find the equilibrium: we claim that regardless of the strategy
of the Blue player, the dominant strategy for the Red player is to put her only seed on
u. To prove this we consider all possible cases: Above we discussed that if the Blue
player plays entirely on component B, the Red player prefers to place her seed on u.
In other cases where the Blue player has a few seeds in A and a few seeds in B, if the
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Red player puts her seed on u, in the worst case (which is the case where all the Blue
seeds are also put on u), she gets in expectation Ml+N+K+1(K+1)2 infections. Whereas if she
plays in component B, what she gets is bounded by the maximum infections that can
possibly be achieved in B with K seeds which is, as argued before, at most N + lM +K
(The later is equal to N(k+1)4 + lM +K). Thus when N is much larger than K, we have
Ml+N+K+1
(K+1)2 >
N
(k+1)4 + lM + K, which means the better strategy for the Red player is
to stay on u, even in the worst case where there is a heavy competition for getting that
node.
Now that we showed selecting u as the seed set is the dominant strategy for the Red
player, it is easy to see the best move for the Blue player is to put all her seeds on u as
well. Suppose not and the Blue player has z < K seeds on u and K − z > 0 seeds in
B. For each seed that Blue moves from component B to u, she increase her expected
infection in component A by at least ( KK+1 − K−1K ) × Ml+N(K+1) ≥ 1(K+1)2 × Ml+N(K+1) (which
is equal to Ml+N(K+1)3 ), while in the component B the expected number of infections she is
losing at most N + lM + K (which is equal to N(k+1)4 + lM + K). Since N  K it is
always beneficial for the Blue player to move her seeds from component B to u. This
means that the only equilibrium is the case where all the seeds are placed on u.
As the result of above, the price of stability for this network is at least:
Ml +N + (K + 1)
Ml+N+(K+1)
K+1 + 1
It is very easy to see that by choosing N sufficiently large, the above can get arbitrarily
close to (K + 1) which is larger than V . This completes the proof.
2
Combining Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, we note that for f(x) = xr and linear g we
obtain the following sharp threshold result:
Corollary 3. Let the switching function be f(x) = xr, and let the selection function be
linear, g(y) = y. Then:
• For any r ≤ 1, the Price of Anarchy (and as a result, Price of Stability) is at most
4 for any graph G;
• For any r > 1 and any V , there exists a graph G for which the Price of Stability
(and as a result, Price of Anarchy) is greater than V .
7. Results: Budget Multiplier
We start with some examples to illustrate the issues that arise. We then derive
sufficient conditions for bounded Budget Multiplier, and show that violations of these
conditions can lead to unbounded Budget Multiplier.
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Figure 5: A graph with PoS greater than K
8. Budget Multiplier: Examples
Suppose that budgets of the firms are KR = 1, KB = 2 and the update rule is such
that all vertices are updated only once. The network contains 3 influential vertices, each
of which has a directed link to all the other n − 3 vertices, respectively. So there are
3(n− 3) links in all. Let n 3.
• Suppose the switching function and selection function are both linear, i.e., f(x) = x
and g(y) = y. There is a unique equilibrium and in this equilibrium, players will
place their resources on distinct influential vertices. The (expected) payoffs to
player R are n/3, while the payoffs to player B are 2n/3. So the Budget Multiplier
is equal to 1.
• Next, suppose the switching function is convex with f(2/3) = 1/25, and the se-
lection function g(y) is as in Tullock (1980). Suppose the two players place their
resources on the three influential vertices. The payoffs to R are g(1/3)n, while firm
B earns g(2/3)n. Clearly this is optimal for firm B as any deviation can only lower
payoffs. And, it can be checked that a deviation by firm R to one of the influential
vertices occupied by player B will yield a payoff of n/100 (approximately). So the
configuration specified is an equilibrium so long as g(1/3) ≥ 1/100. The Budget
Multiplier is now (approximately) 50.
• Finally, suppose the network consists of ` equally-sized connected components. In
each component, there is 1 influential vertex which has a directed link to each of the
(n/`) − 1 other vertices. In equilibrium each player locates on distinct influential
vertices, irrespective of whether the switching function is convex or concave and
whether the Tullock selection function is linear (s = 1) or whether it is polarizing
(s > 1). The Budget Multiplier is now equal to 1.
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These examples show that for fixed network and updating rule, variations in the
switching and selection functions generate large variations in Budget Multiplier. More-
over, for fixed switching and selection functions the payoffs depend crucially on the
network.
Theorem 3 provides a set of sufficient conditions on the switching and selection func-
tion, under which the Budget Multiplier is uniformly bounded. Theorem 4 shows how
even small violations of these conditions can lead to arbitrarily high Budget Multiplier.
Theorem 5 illustrates the role of concavity of the switching function in shaping the Bud-
get Multiplier.
8.1. Budget Multiplier: Upper Bound
As in the PoA analysis, it will be technically convenient to return to the generalized
adoption function model. Recall that for PoA, competitiveness of h and additivity of
H were needed to prove upper bounds, but we didn’t require that the implied selection
function be linear. Here we introduce that additional requirement, and prove that the
(pure strategy) Budget Multiplier is bounded.
Theorem 3. Suppose the adoption function h(αR, αB) is competitive, that H is additive
in its arguments, and that the implied selection function is linear:
g(αR, αB) =
h(αR, αB)
h(αR, αB) + h(αB , αB)
= αR/(αR + αB)
Then the pure strategy Budget Multiplier is at most 2 for any graph G.16
Proof The proof borrows elements from the proof of Theorem 1, and introduces the
additional notion of tracking or attributing indirect infections generated by the dynamics
to specific seeds.
Consider any pure Nash equilibrium given by seed sets SR and SB in which |SR| =
K > |SB | = L. For our purposes the interesting case is one in which
E[χR|(SR, SB)] ≥ E[χB |(SR, SB))]
and so
E[χR|(SR, SB)] ≥ E[χR + χB |(SR, SB)]/2.
Since the adoption function is competitive and additive, Lemma 1 implies that
E[χR|(SR, ∅)] ≥ E[χR|(SR, SB)]
That is, the Red player only benefits from the departure of the Blue player.
Let us consider the dynamics of the solo Red process given by (SR, ∅). We first intro-
duce a faithful simulation of these dynamics that also allows us to attribute subsequent
infections to exactly one of the seeds in SR; we shall call this process the attribution
16The theorem actually holds for any equilibrium in which the player with the larger budget plays a
pure strategy; the player with smaller budget may always play mixed. It is easy to find cases with such
equilibria. The theorem also holds for general mixed strategies under certain conditions — for instance,
when both f and g are linear and the larger budget is an integer multiple of the smaller.
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simulation of (SR, ∅). Thus, let SR = {v1, . . . , vK} be the initial Red infections, and let
us label vi by Ri, and label all other vertices U . All infections in the process will also be
assigned one of the K labels Ri in the following manner: when updating a vertex v, we
first compute the fraction αRv of neighbors whose current label is one of R1, . . . , RK , and
with probability H(αRv , 0) = h(α
R
v , 0) + h(0, α
R
v ) we decide that an infection will occur
(otherwise the label of v is updated to U). If an infection occurs, we simply choose an
infected neighbor of v uniformly at random, and update v to have the same label (which
will be one of the Ri). It is easily seen that at every step, the dynamics of the (SR, ∅)
process are faithfully implemented if we drop label subscripts and simply view any label
Ri as a generic Red infection R. Furthermore, at all times every infected vertex has only
one of the labels Ri. Thus if we denote the expected number of vertices with label Ri
by E[χRi |(SR, ∅)], we have E[χR|(SR, ∅)] =
∑K
i=1 E[χRi |(SR, ∅)]. Let us assume without
loss of generality that the labels Ri are sorted in order of decreasing E[χRi |(SR, ∅)].
We now consider the payoff to Blue under a deviation from SB to the set SˆB =
{v1, . . . , vL} ⊂ SR — that is, the L “most profitable” initial infections in SR. Our goal
is to show that the Blue player must enjoy roughly the same payoff from these L seeds
as the Red player did in the solo attribution simulation.
Lemma 3.
E[χB |(SR, SˆB)] ≥ 1
2
L∑
i=1
E[χRi |(SR, ∅)]
≥ L
2K
E[χR|(SR, ∅)]
Proof The second inequality follows from
E[χR|(SR, ∅)] =
K∑
i=1
E[χRi |(SR, ∅)],
established above, and fact that the vertices in SR are ordered in decreasing profitability.
For the first inequality, we introduce coupled attribution simulations for the two processes
(SR, ∅) (the solo Red process) and (SR, SˆB). For simplicity, let us actually examine
(SR, ∅) and (SR− SˆB , SˆB); the latter joint process is simply the process (SR, SˆB), but in
which the contested seeded nodes in SˆB are all won by the Blue player. (The proof for
the general (SR, SˆB) case is the same but causes the factor of 1/2 in the lemma.)
The coupled attribution dynamics are as follows: as above, in the solo Red process,
for 1 ≤ i ≤ L, the vertex vi in SR is initially labeled Ri, and all other vertices are labeled
U . In the joint process, the vertex vi is labeled Bi for i ≤ L (corresponding to the Blue
invasions of SR), while for L < i ≤ K the vertex vi is labeled Ri as before. Now at the
first update vertex v, let αRv be the fraction of Red neighbors in the solo process, and let
α˜Rv and α˜
B
v be the fraction of Red and Blue neighbors, respectively, in the joint process.
Note that initially we have αRv = α˜
R
v + α˜
B
v . Thus by additivity H, the total prob-
abilities of infection H(αRv , 0) and H(α˜
R
v , α˜
B
v ) in the two processes must be identical.
We thus flip a common coin with this shared infection probability to determine whether
infections occur in the coupled process. If not, v is updated to U in both processes. If
so, we now use a coupled attribution step in which we pick an infected neighbor of v
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at random and copy its label to v in both processes. Thus if a label with index i ≤ L
is chosen, v will be updated to Ri in the solo process, and to Bi in the joint process;
whereas if L < i ≤ K is chosen, the update will be to Ri in both processes. It is easily
verified that each of the two processes faithfully implement the dynamics of the solo and
joint attribution processes, respectively.
This coupled update dynamic maintains two invariants: infections are always matched
in the two processes, thus maintaining αRv = α˜
R
v + α˜
B
v for all v and every step; and for
all i ≤ L, every Ri attribution in the solo Red process is matched by a Bi attribution in
the joint process, thus establishing the lemma. 2 (Lemma 3)
Thus, by simply imitating the strategy of the Red player in the L most profitable re-
sources, the Blue player can expect to infect (1/2)(L/K) proportion of infections accruing
to Red in isolation. Since (SR, SB) is an equilibrium, the payoffs of Blue in equilibrium
must also respect this inequality. 2 (Theorem 3)
8.2. Budget Multiplier: Lower Bound
We have already seen that concavity of f and linearity of g lead to bounded PoA and
Budget Multiplier, and that even slight deviations from concavity can lead to unbounded
PoA. We now show that fixing f to be linear (which is concave), slight deviations from
linearity of g towards polarizing g can lead to unbounded Budget Multiplier, for similar
reasons as in the PoA case: graph structure can amplify a slightly polarizing g towards
arbitrarily high punishment of the minority player.
Theorem 4. Let the switching function be f(x) = x, and let the selection function be of
Tullock contest form, g(y) = ys/(ys+((1−y)s), where s > 1. Then for any V > 0, there
exists a graph G for which the Budget Multiplier is greater than V . More precisely, there
is a family of graphs for which the Budget Multiplier grows linearly with the population
size (number of vertices).
Proof As in the PoA lower bound, the proof relies on a layered amplification graph,
this time amplifying punishment in the selection function rather than convexity in the
switching function. The graph will consist of two components, C1 and C2.
Let us fix the budget of the Red player to be 3, and that of the Blue player to be
1 (the proof generalizes to other unequal values). C1 is a directed, layered graph with
k + 1 layers. The first layer has 4 vertices, and layers 2 through k have n  4 vertices,
while layer k+ 1 has n1 vertices, where we shall choose n1  n, meaning that payoffs in
C1 are dominated by infections in the final layer.
The second component C2 is a 2-layer directed graph, with 1 vertex in the first layer
and n2 in the final layer, and all directed edges from layer 1 to 2. We will eventually
choose n2  n1, so that C1 is the much bigger component. We choose an update rule in
which each layer is updated in succession and only once.
Consider the configuration in which Red places its 3 infections in the first layer of
C1, and Blue places its 1 infection in the first layer of C2. We shall later show that this
configuration is a Nash equilibrium. In this configuration, the expected payoff to Red is
approximately
∑k
i=2(3/4)n+ (3/4)n1 by linearity of f ; notice that the selection function
does not enter since the players are in disjoint components. Similarly, the expected payoff
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to Blue is (n2 + 1). In this configuration, the ratio of Red and Blue expected payoffs
is thus at least (3/4)n1/(n2 + 1) ' (3/4)n1/n2 (as n1, n2 are chosen to be very large
numbers), whereas the initial budget ratio is 1/3. So the Budget Multiplier for this
configuration is at least n1/(4n2).
We now develop conditions under which this configuration is an equilibrium. It is
easy to verify that red is playing a best response. Moving vertices to later layers of C1
lowers Red’s payoff, since n 4 and f is linear. Finally, moving infections to invade the
first layer of C2 will lower Red’s payoff as long as, say, (1/4)n1 (Red’s current payoff per
initial infection in the final layer of C1) exceeds n2 (the maximum amount Red could get
in C2 by full deviation), or n1  4n2.
We now turn to deviations by Blue. Moving the solo Blue initial infection to the
second layer of C2 is clearly a losing proposition. So consider deviations in which Blue
moves to vertices in component 1. If he moves to the lone unoccupied vertex in layer 1
of C1, his payoff is approximately:
k∑
i=2
g(i)(1/4)n+ g(k+1)(1/4)n1
=
k∑
i=2
(1/4)s
i
(1/4)si + (3/4)si
n
+
(1/4)s
k+1
(1/4)sk+1 + (3/4)sk+1
n1
Similarly, if Blue directly invades a Red vertex, Blue’s payoff is approximately
χ =
1
2
×
(
k∑
i=2
(1/3)s
i
(1/3)si + (2/3)si
n+
(1/3)s
k+1
(1/3)sk+1 + (2/3)sk+1
n1
)
Since in both cases Blue’s payoff is being exponentially dampened at each successive
layer, it is easy to see that the second deviation is more profitable. Finally, Blue may
choose a vertex in a later layer of C1, but again by n 4 and the linearity of f , this will
be suboptimal.
Thus as long as we arrange that n2 — Blue’s payoff without deviation — exceeds χ
above, we will have ensured that no player has an incentive to deviate from the specified
strategy configuration. Let us scale n1 up as large as necessary to have χ dominated by
the term involving n1, and now set n2 to equal that term:
n2 =
(1/3)s
k+1
(1/3)sk+1 + (2/3)sk+1
n1
in order to satisfy the equilibrium condition. The ratio n1/n2, which we have already
shown above lower bounds the Budget Multiplier, is thus a function that is increasing
exponentially in k for any fixed s > 1. Thus by choosing k sufficiently large, we can force
the Budget Multiplier larger than any chosen value. 2 (Theorem 4)
Combining Theorem 3 and Theorem 4, we note that for linear f and Tullock g, we
obtain the following sharp threshold result, which is analogous to the PoA result in
Corollary 3.
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Corollary 4. Let the switching function f be linear, and let the selection function g be
Tullock, g(y) = ys/(ys + (1− y)s). Then:
• For s = 1, the Budget Multiplier is at most 2 for any graph G;
• For any s > 1 and any V , there exists a graph G for which the Budget Multiplier
is greater than V .
In fact, if we permit a slight generalization of our model, in which certain vertices
in the graph are “hard-wired” to adopt only one or the other color (so there is no use
for the opposing player to seed them), unbounded Budget Multiplier also holds in the
Tullock case for s < 1 (equalizing). So in this generalization, linearity of g is required
for bounded Budget Multiplier.
Figure 6: Illustration of the construction in the proof of Theorem 5. Top: Basic gadget. Bottom:
Equilibrium construction.
We have thus shown that even when the switching function is “nice” (linear), even
slight punishment in the selection function can lead to unbounded Budget Multiplier.
Recall that we require switching and selection functions to be 0 (1, respectively) on
input 0 (respectively) and increasing, and additionally that g(1/2) = 1/2. The following
theorem shows that if f is allowed to be a sufficiently convex function, then the Budget
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Multiplier is again unbounded for any selection function. This establishes the importance
of concavity of f for both the PoA and Budget Multiplier.
Theorem 5. Let the switching function f satisfy f(1/2) = 0 and f(1) = 1. Then for
any value V > 0, there exists G such that the Budget Multiplier is greater than V .
Proof Let the Blue player have 1 initial infection and the Red player have K ≥ 2 (the
proof can be generalized to any unequal initial budgets, which we comment on below).
Consider the directed graph shown in the top panel of Figure 6, where we have arranged
the 1 Blue and K Red seeded nodes in a particular configuration. Aside from the initially
infected vertices, this graph consists of a directed chain of K vertices, whose final vertex
then connects to a large number N  K of terminal vertices. Let us update each vertex
in the chain from left to right, followed by the terminal vertices.
Let us first compute the expected payoffs for the two players in this configuration.
First, note that since f(1) = 1, it is certain that every vertex in the chain will be infected
in sequence, followed by all of the terminal vertices; the only question is which player
will win the most. By choosing N  K we can ignore the infections in the chain and
just focus on the terminal vertices, which will be won by whichever player infects the
final chain vertex. It is easy to see that the probability this vertex is won by Blue is
1/2K , since Blue must “beat” a competing Red infection at every vertex in the chain.
Thus the expected payoffs are approximately N/2K for Blue and N(1− 1/2K) for Red.
If this configuration were an equilibrium, the Budget Multiplier would thus be 2K/K,
which can be made as large as desired by choosing K large enough.
However, this configuration is not an equilibrium — clearly, either player would be
better off by simplifying initially infecting the final vertex of the chain, thus winning all
the terminal vertices. This is fixed by the construction shown in the bottom panel of
Figure 6, where we have replicated the chain and terminal vertices M times, but have only
the original K + 1 seeded nodes as common “inputs” to all of these replications. Notice
that now if either player defects to an uninfected vertex, neither player will receive any
infections in any of the other replications, since now there is a missing “input infection”
and reaching the terminal vertices requires all K + 1 input infections since f(1/2) = 0
(each chain vertex has two inputs, and if either is uninfected, the chain of infections
halts). Similarly, if either player attempts to defect by invading the seeded nodes of the
other player, there will be no payoff for either player in any of the replications. Thus
the most Blue can obtain by deviation is N (moving its one infection to the final chain
vertex of a single replication), while the most Red can obtain is KN (moving all of their
infections to the final chain vertices of K replications. The equilibrium requirements are
thus M(N/2K) > N for Blue, and MN(1−1/2k) > KN for Red. The Blue requirement
is the stronger one, and yields M > 2K . The Budget Multiplier for this configuration is
the same as for the single replication case, and thus if we let K be as large as desired
and choose M > 2K , we can make the Budget Multiplier exceed any value. 2
(Theorem 5)
It is worth noting that even if the Blue player has L > 1 seeded nodes, and we repeat
the construction above with chain length K +L− 1, but with Blue forced to play at the
beginning of the chain, followed by all the Red infections, the argument and calculations
above are unchanged: effectively, Blues L seeded nodes are no better than 1 infection,
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because they are simply causing a chain of L − 1 Blue infections before then facing the
chain of K Red inputs. In fact, even if we let L  K, Blue’s payoff will still be a
factor of 1/2K smaller than Red’s. Thus in some sense the theorem shows that if f is
sufficiently convex, not only is the Budget Multiplier unbounded, but the much smaller
initial budget may yield arbitrarily higher payoffs!
9. Concluding Remarks
We have developed a general framework for the study of competition between firms
who use their resources to maximize adoption of their product by consumers located
in a social network. This framework yields a very rich class of competitive strategies,
which depend in subtle ways on the dynamics, the relative budgets of the players and the
structure of the social network. We identified properties of the dynamics of local adoption
under which resource use by players is efficient or unboundedly inefficient. Similarly, we
identified adoption dynamics for which networks neutralize or dramatically accentuate
ex-ante resource difference across players.
There are a number of other questions which can be fruitfully investigated within
our framework. One obvious direction is to understand the structure of equilibria in
greater detail, and in particular how it is related to network structure. While our results
on the PoA and Budget Multiplier demonstrate that network structure can interact in
dramatic ways with the switching and selection functions at equilibrium, a more general
and detailed understanding would be of interest.
Other interesting directions include algorithmic issues such as computing equilibria
and best responses in our framework, and how their difficulty depends on the switching
and selection functions; and the multi-stage version of our game, in which the two firms
may gradually spend their seed budgets in a way that depends on the evolving state of
the network.
Appendix A. Technology adoption examples
This section illustrates a range of applications for our model.
• Social Network Services (Facebook, Google+, etc.): Here adoption probabilities
might grow slowly with a small fraction of adopting neighbors, since there is little
value in using (any) social networking services if none of your friends are using them;
thus a convex switching function f (r > 1) might be a reasonable model. However,
given that it is currently difficult or impossible to export friends and other settings
from one service to another, there are strong platform effects in service selection,
so a polarizing or even winner-take-all selection function g (s > 1) might be most
appropriate.
• Televisions (Sharp, Sony, etc.): Televisions were immediately useful upon their
introduction, without the need for adoption by neighbors, since they allowed imme-
diate access to broadcast programming; the adoption by neighbors serves mainly as
a route for information sharing about value of the product. The information value
of more neighbors adopting a product is falling with adoption and so a concave f
might be appropriate. Compared to social networking services, the platform effects
are lower here, and so a linear or equalizing g is appropriate.
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• Mobile Phone Service (Verizon, T-Mobile, etc.): Mobile phone service was imme-
diately useful upon its introduction without adoption by neighbors, since one could
always call land lines, thus arguing for a concave f . Since telephony systems need
to be interoperable, platform effects derive mainly from marketing efforts such as
“Friends and Family” programs, and thus are extant but perhaps weak, suggesting
an equalizing g.
Appendix B. The Multiple Player Version of the Game
Here we generalize the results in Sections 6 and 7 to the multiplayer version where
there are m > 2 firms/players marketing their products on the network.
We first generalize the dynamics as follows: Let the players be denoted by 1, 2, ...,m.
When updating an uninfected vertex v, if the fraction of its neighbors who have adopted
the product of the ith player is xi (1 ≤ i ≤ m), then f(x1 + x2 + ... + xm) specifies
the probability with which v becomes infected. In addition g( xix1+...+xm ) specifies the
probability that v adopts the ith product.
Suppose Si is the seed set chosen by the ith player, and χi denotes the number of
people who eventually adopt product i (1 ≤ i ≤ m). We need the following notations:
Definition 1. Π(S1, S2, ..., Sm) denotes the expected number of people who eventually
adopt some product, i.e. Π(S1, S2, ..., Sm) = E[χ1 + ...+ χm|(S1, ..., Sm)].
Definition 2. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ m, Πi(S1, S2, ..., Sm) denotes the expected number
of people who eventually adopt the product of i’th player, i.e. Πi(S1, S2, ..., Sm) =
E[χi|(S1, ..., Sm)].
Definition 3. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ m, Π−i(S1, S2, ..., Sm) denotes the expected number of
people who eventually adopt some product other than the i’th product, i.e.
Π−i(S1, S2, ..., Sm) = E[
∑
j 6=i
χj |(S1, ..., Sm)]
.
For the m-player version of the game, if f is concave and g is linear, then the following
inequalities hold17:
Lemma 4. Π1(S1, ∅, ..., ∅) ≥ Π1(S1, S2, ..., Sm).
Proof This is equivalent to Lemma 1. To prove the claim, we just map the spread process
corresponding to (S1, S2, ..., Sm) to the spread process corresponding to (SR, SB) in the
two-player version of the game, in which we assume SR = S1 and SB = S1 ∪ ... ∪ Sm.
It is straightforward to show that at each time step, ΠR(SR, SB) = Π1(S1, S2, ..., Sm)
and ΠB(SR, SB) = Π−1(S1, S2, ..., Sm). Then by following the same steps as in proof of
Lemma 1, we can conclude the desired inequality. 2
17We present the inequalities for the first player but similar equalities hold for every other player as
well.
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Lemma 5. Π−1(S1, S2, ..., Sm) ≤ Π−1(∅, S2, ..., Sm).
Proof Similar to the proof of Lemma 4. 2
Lemma 6. Π(T1, S2, ..., Sm) ≤ Π(S1, S2, ..., Sm), where T1 ⊆ S1.
Proof This follows directly from monotonicity of the switching function. 2
Applying (a series of) the above inequality, we can easily obtain the following two
inequalities:
Corollary 5. Π(S1, S2, ..., Sm) ≥ Π(S1, ∅, ..., ∅).
Corollary 6. Π(S1, S2, ..., Sm) ≥ Π(∅, S2, ..., Sm).
We are now ready to show that for the multiplayer version of the game, there is an
O(m) upper bound on the PoA, when the switching function is concave and the selection
function is linear:
Theorem 6. When there are m players (m > 2) competing, if f is concave and g is
linear, then the PoA is less than or equal to 2m.
Proof Suppose not, and there is a graph G in which PoA is greater than 2m. Let
(S1, S2, ..., Sm) denote the strategy profile of players in the worst equilibrium, and
(S∗1 , S
∗
2 , ..., S
∗
m) denote the strategy that maximizes the total number of infections. Since
PoA is greater than 2m, we have:
1
2m
Π(S∗1 , S
∗
2 , ..., S
∗
m) > Π(S1, S2, ..., Sm) (B.1)
which is equivalent to:
1
m
Π(S∗1 , S
∗
2 , ..., S
∗
m) > 2Π(S1, S2, ..., Sm) (B.2)
In addition, according to pigeon hole principle, there is a player i such that
Πi(S
∗
1 , S
∗
2 , ..., S
∗
m) ≥
1
m
Π(S∗1 , S
∗
2 , ..., S
∗
m)
Without loss of generality, assume i = 1 and we have:
Π1(S
∗
1 , S
∗
2 , ..., S
∗
m) ≥
1
m
Π(S∗1 , S
∗
2 , ..., S
∗
m) (B.3)
According to lemma 4:
Π1(S
∗
1 , ∅, ..., ∅) ≥ Π1(S∗1 , S∗2 , ..., S∗m) (B.4)
So combining the above with inequality B.3 we have:
Π1(S
∗
1 , ∅, ..., ∅) ≥
1
m
Π(S∗1 , S
∗
2 , ..., S
∗
m) (B.5)
Now we replace the strategy of the first player in the worst equilibrium, i.e. S1, with
S∗1 and show that Π1(S
∗
1 , S2, ..., Sm) > Π1(S1, S2, ..., Sm). This means that S1 is not the
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best response to S−1, which contradicts with the assumption of being in an equilibrium,
and it finishes the proof.
We just need to prove that the above inequality holds.
According to corollary 5, we have Π(S∗1 , S2, ..., Sm) ≥ Π(S∗1 , ∅, ..., ∅). Combining this
with inequality B.5 we get Π(S∗1 , S2, ..., Sm) ≥ 1mΠ(S∗1 , S∗2 , ..., S∗m). Then combining this
last inequality with inequality B.2, we have:
Π(S∗1 , S2, ..., Sm) > 2Π(S1, S2, ..., Sm) (B.6)
or equivalently:
1
2
Π(S∗1 , S2, ..., Sm) > Π(S1, S2, ..., Sm) (B.7)
On the other hand, according to corollary 6, Π(∅, S2, ..., Sm) < Π(S1, S2, ..., Sm), and
therefore combining with equation B.7 we get:
1
2
Π(S∗1 , S2, ..., Sm) > Π(∅, S2, ..., Sm) (B.8)
According to lemma 5, we know that Π−1(S∗1 , S2, ..., Sm) ≤ Π−1(∅, S2, ..., Sm). Based
on the fact that Π(∅, S2, ..., Sm) = Π−1(∅, S2, ..., Sm), we can write it as
Π−1(S∗1 , S2, ..., Sm) ≤ Π(∅, S2, ..., Sm)
Now combining this last inequality with B.8 we get:
1
2
Π(S∗1 , S2, ..., Sm) > Π−1(S
∗
1 , S2, ..., Sm) (B.9)
Since by definition Π(S∗1 , S2, ..., Sm) = Π−1(S
∗
1 , S2, ..., Sm) + Π1(S
∗
1 , S2, ..., Sm), and
by inequality B.8 we have 12Π(S
∗
1 , S2, ..., Sm) > Π−1(S
∗
1 , S2, ..., Sm), the following holds:
Π1(S
∗
1 , S2, ..., Sm) >
1
2
Π(S∗1 , S2, ..., Sm). (B.10)
According to inequality B.7 we have that Π1(S
∗
1 , S2, ..., Sm) > Π(S1, S2, ..., Sm).
Since it is obvious that Π(S1, S2, ..., Sm) ≥ Π1(S1, S2, ..., Sm), we can conclude that
Π1(S
∗
1 , S2, ..., Sm) > Π1(S1, S2, ..., Sm) as desired. 2
It is easy to see that the rest of the results can also be generalized to the multiplayer
version. Since the proofs are straightforward, we just state the results here:
Theorem 7. When there are m players (m > 2) competing, if f is slightly convex and
g is linear, then the PoS can be unbounded.
To accommodate the definition of the Budget Multiplier for the case of more than 2
players, we change the definition as follows: For any fixed graph, local dynamics, and
initial budgets, with K1 ≥ K2 ≥ ... ≥ Km, let (σ1, σ2, ..., σm) be the Nash equilibrium
that maximizes the quantity
Πi(σ1, σ2, ..., σm)
Πj(σ1, σ2, ..., σm)
× Kj
Ki
among all Nash equilibria (σ1, σ2, ..., σm) and and all choices of 1 ≤ i < j ≤ m; The
resulting maximized quantity is the Budget Multiplier.
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Theorem 8. When there are m players (m > 2) competing, if f is concave and g is
linear, then the pure strategy Budget Multiplier is bounded by 2 across all networks.
Theorem 9. When there are m players (m > 2) competing, if f is slightly convex and
g is linear, then the Budget Multiplier can be unbounded.
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